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Atypical Work: Who Gets It, and Where Does It Lead?  
Some U.S. Evidence Using the NLSY79 
 
Atypical work arrangements have long been criticized as offering more precarious and lower 
paid work than regular open-ended employment. In an important paper, Booth et al. (2002) 
were among the first to recognize that notwithstanding their potential deficiencies, such jobs 
also functioned as a stepping stone to permanent work. This conclusion proved prescient and 
has received increasing support in Europe. In the present note, we provide a parallel analysis 
to Booth et al. for the United States – somewhat of a missing link in the evolving empirical 
literature – and obtain not dissimilar similar findings for the category of temporary workers as 
do they for fixed-term contract workers. 
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I. Introduction 
Atypical work, as its name implies, has often been looked upon with disfavour by 
economists in terms of the remuneration and career possibilities attaching to temporary 
work of this nature. Indeed, in their introduction to the Economic Journal symposium on 
temporary jobs, Booth, Dolado, and Frank (2002) summarize the thrust of the 
contributions as suggesting that the expansion of temporary jobs as a way of increasing 
labour market flexibility may be undesirable. Yet in analyzing the British evidence, Booth, 
Francesconi, and Frank (2002) while still concluding that temporary jobs are not desirable 
vis-à-vis open-ended employment temper this judgment with evidence that the main work 
form they examine – fixed-term contracts – does provide a stepping stone to regular 
employment and carries no long term wage disadvantage for women who start off their 
careers in fixed-term employment. 
Since the symposium, the stepping-stones counter argument has if anything 
gathered force (e.g. Freier and Steiner, 2008; García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón. 2003; 
Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini, 2004, 2008; Kvasnika, 2008; Portugal and Varajão, 2009; 
Zijl, van den Berg, and Heyma, 2004). That said, the shifting evidence did not dissuade 
the EU from passing the long-delayed third and ‘final’ piece of atypical worker legislation 
in November 2008 covering temporary agency work.
1 Under Directive 2008/104/EC, the 
basic working conditions of temporary agency workers are for the duration of their 
assignment at the user undertaking to be at least equal to those that would obtain had they 
been recruited directly into that job by the undertaking (Official Journal, 2008). This equal 
treatment principle is to apply from the first day of an assignment unless otherwise 
amended on the basis of agreement between organized labour and capital (so that the 
qualifying period is 12 weeks in the case of the United Kingdom).
2 
Something of a stand-out in the modern literature is the U.S. evidence, which is 
less developed than its European counterpart and mentioned only en passant in the 
symposium.
3 Yet we can use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 
Cohort (NLSY79) to broadly replicate Booth, Francesconi, and Frank’s (2002) wage and 
duration analysis (if not their evaluation of job satisfaction), and provide a useful point of 
contact between the two literatures regarding career prospects. We shall provide evidence 
on two categories of atypical workers: temporary workers, comprising temporary agency   3
workers and direct hire temps, and the composite group of contractors/consultants. 
Temporary workers merit special attention in the wake of the recent EU legislation while 
contractors/consultants are of interest because of their earning a wage premium. As we 
shall see, our results for the former category fairly closely accord with those of Booth, 
Francesconi, and Frank. 
 
II. Data 
The NLSY79 first began asking workers about their type of working arrangements in 
1994. The 1994 survey also contains data on the current job as well as retrospective data 
on the last four jobs held up to then. The questions on working arrangement were thence 
continued biennially until the 1998 wave, at which point they were discontinued. (Note 
that we can recoup the working arrangements between these three waves from data 
contained in the respondents’ work histories.) Using this information from the NLSY79, 
we extracted two datasets. The first uses information from the 1994, 1996 and 1998 
surveys,
4 including their retrospective content, to construct the pathways and durations of 
jobs held by respondents from 1992 onwards.
 The second sample uses the 1993 to 1998 
waves of the NLSY79 for the analysis of wage development.
5  
  We can identify two principal forms of atypical work in the NLSY79: ‘temporary 
workers’ and contractors/consultants. The former category comprises the separate 
categories of temporary agency workers and direct hire temporaries that we amalgamate 
on sample size grounds.
6 Information on contractors and consultants is not separated out 
in the survey and is therefore a composite grouping to begin with. Another potential group 
of atypical workers, termed ‘other work types,’ can be identified in the survey. Since 
members of this group are disproportionately self-employed individuals, the decision was 
taken to exclude them. (We note parenthetically that a wider array of atypical jobs is 
available in the other main data set available to U.S. researchers in this area: the 
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangement Supplement (CAEAS) to the 
Current Population Survey. Unfortunately use of this material is precluded because we can 
at best identify worker histories for eighteen months.) 
Using the data for our first sample identified above, we are able to trace the 
pathways used by workers engaged in temporary work over interval, 1992-98. Using the   4
three main surveys and their retrospective components, we can identify the sequence of 
jobs and the associated work arrangements held by workers over this not inconsiderable 
interval. This sequencing provides us with some guidance as to whether temporary 
employment serves as a potential stepping stone into regular employment and of the 
employee characteristics that underpin such transitions. For each job held by workers, we 
also identify its industrial and occupational affiliation, the size of the employment unit, 
and the status of the job as either part-time or full-time. We use the demographic and other 
characteristics (e.g. age, education, region, ethnicity, etc.) of the worker at the time of each 
NLSY interview (1994, 1996 and 1998) to estimate their potential impact on job 
transitions; while for those transitions that take place between waves we take the worker 
characteristics recorded in the earlier survey (i.e. for different jobs). 
Our second sample allows us to estimate the medium-term implications of 
temporary and contract work employment on a worker’s wages. Like Booth, Francesconi, 
and Frank, we are able to identify the total number of temporary and contracting jobs held 
by a worker over the sample period, 1993-98. But we also seek to improve upon this 
measure by recording the number of years spent in either type of atypical employment on 
the grounds that worker remuneration is more likely to be impacted by a prolonged period 
of time spent in an atypical job – and, in particular, temporary employment – rather than 
just the frequency of such jobs. The wage data pertain to the primary job held by a 
respondent at the time of each NLSY interview. Note further that we included those 
temporary or contracting jobs starting and ending between any two waves in our measure 
of the time spent in atypical work. For temporal consistency, the wages of such jobs were 
not used in our wage analysis. 
  For both samples, we include information on the total amount of general labour 
market experience accrued by a worker since 1975 as a measure of accumulated (general) 
human capital and examine its implications for wage development and job transitions. We 
also constructed proxies for a worker’s ability using the Armed Forces Qualification Test 
results reported in the 1981 NLSY. Specifically, proxies for a worker’s mathematical, 
verbal, practical and scientific ability were constructed by using the test results for these 
general areas and then collecting the residuals obtained from the regression of scores on a 
vector of age and education dummies.    5
Descriptive information on the remuneration and characteristics of our atypical 
workers is provided in Table 1. Slightly less than 13,500 jobs were recorded by the 
NLSY79 respondents over the period 1993-1998. From panel (a) of the table it can be 
seen that a little over 6 percent of all jobs held were temporary, whereas contracting or 
consulting positions were less than 2 percent of the total. The frequency of these two 
atypical work arrangements is slightly lower in our sample than for the U.S. workforce as 
a whole because of the older cohort of workers contained in the NLSY79 sample (see 
Cohany, 1998). 
(Table 1 near here) 
  Panel (b) of Table 1 presents information on the inflation-adjusted average hourly 
wages of the three groups, while panel (c) provides t-tests of the respective wage 
differences. Temporary workers appear to fare poorly relative to those employed in either 
regular work or contracting/consulting. The $4.80 differential reported for the whole 
sample represents a 45 percent wage disparity between temporary and regular work, and 
captures the much greater earnings penalty applying in the case of men than women. All 
wage differences between temporary and regular workers (and contracting/consulting 
workers) are statistically significant. When we compare contracting/consulting workers 
with regular workers, however, the broad earnings picture is reversed, although only in the 
case of females is the now favourable earnings gap (of almost $4) statistically significant. 
(Table 2 near here) 
Table 2 presents information on job durations (panel (a)) and job pathways (panel 
(b)) over the 1992 to 1998 waves of NLSY79 data, with data from the 2000 wave being 
used to update the former information. Kaplan-Meier estimates of both completed and 
incomplete durations of the various work arrangements reveal that fully fifty percent of 
temporary jobs are completed within six months for both males and females. The median 
duration for contracting/consulting work at 1.83 years (1.7 years for males and 1.9 years 
for females) was more than twice that of temporary employment. Open-ended jobs had a 
median duration of just under three years for both males and females. Only four (two) 
percent of male (female) temporary jobs lasted more than five years as compared with 
almost 40 percent in the case of regular jobs.   6
As for the pathways, slightly more than one-half of temporary and 
contracting/consulting workers remained in the same work arrangement over the sample 
period. Unsurprisingly, of those who transitioned out of either atypical work arrangement, 
regular employment rather than another form of atypical work was the preferred path: 48 
percent of the agency temps and 45 percent of contractors/consultants subsequently 
entered open-ended employment. The transition rates out of regular work show that this is 
a highly stable work arrangement: more that 96 percent of all those initially in regular 
employment either took another regular job or remained in the same job across all seven 
years of the sample period. 
With these preliminaries behind us, what is the cet. par. evidence on transitions 
and wage development? 
 
III. Findings  
We have seen that the majority of atypical workers transition into permanent employment. 
But what type of workers are they? To address this issue, we specify a discrete time 
proportional hazard model in the manner of Booth, Francesconi, and Frank, linking 
transitions into open-ended employment to a number of individual attributes, including 
AFQT scores, and job specific characteristics. The model is estimated for temporary 
agency workers alone because small sample size prohibited estimation  in the case of 
contractors/consultants. Although the covariates are not identical as between our two 
studies, the results make sense in general and are relatively consistent with the findings of 
the British study.  
(Table 3 near here) 
Thus, from Table 3, we see age – here a continuous rather than a categorical 
variable – is strongly negatively associated with transitions into open-ended employment 
and for both genders (whereas this is the case for males alone in Britain). The coefficient 
estimate for schooling – again a continuous rather than a categorical variable here – is 
positive throughout. That said, it is not statistically significant for females. Interestingly, 
black male temporary workers have a heightened probability of exiting into regular 
employment than their white counterparts whereas the opposite is true for Hispanics of 
both genders, even if this latter result is only marginally significant for females. The   7
incorporation of AFQT scores is somewhat disappointing. Although higher verbal ability 
improves the chances of exiting from temporary work into regular employment for 
females, this is not true for males for whom the coefficient estimate is negative albeit 
statistically insignificant. For its part, practical ability appears to detract from transitioning 
into regular employment for females. Unlike the British case, part-time status has no 
adverse effect on transition rates. Nor for that matter is employer size related to transitions 
into regular employment, which might suggest that it is not only large employers that use 
temporary employment as a screen. The contribution of industrial affiliation is statistically 
insignificant throughout with the one exception of the personal services sector. Males in 
this sector are less likely to transition into regular employment. Interestingly, Booth, 
Francesconi, and Frank obtain the same result for the ‘protection and personal services’ 
occupation in respect of casual (if not fixed-term) work. Finally, none of our occupational 
coefficients proved statistically significant. 
To what extent do the large wage gaps between regular, open-ended employment 
and temporary work observed for males and females, but especially the former, reflect 
differential human capital endowments and the like. In Table 4 we report simple OLS 
regressions to measure the effects of such factors on log wages. Our regressors include 
those used earlier in modeling (temporary) worker transitions into regular employment. 
They are augmented in the manner of Booth Francsconi, and Frank, to include labour 
market experience. The authors measure experience as over the survey period; we measure 
it as time spent in employment since 1976, as this more accurately captures a workers true 
workforce experience, and, as a result, is a better reflection of how experience impacts 
wages. Following Booth et al., we also include linear and quadratic number of previous 
jobs held (i.e. the number of temporary jobs and the number of contracting/consulting 
jobs) as well as interactions between each and lifetime experience to determine whether 
the returns to experience differ by contract type. 
(Table 4 near here) 
Table 4 presents summary results of our wage regressions.
7 The basic result is that, 
after controlling for human capital, observed ability, and demographic, industrial and 
occupational differences, atypical work appears to have few adverse implications for 
female earnings over the 1993-98 interval, while unfavourably impacting males earnings.   8
  Focusing on the separate findings for males and females, and beginning with the 
results in column (3) of the table, we see that each temporary job held by males serves to 
reduce wages, by very roughly twenty-one percent, when compared to those males who 
never held a temporary job. The coefficient estimate for the quadratic term suggests that 
this gap falls with the number of jobs taken over the five-year interval. Observe that the 
estimated cet. par. differential is around one-half that of the crude wage gap earlier 
reported in Table 1, suggesting that a good portion of the wage disadvantage for males in 
temporary employment can be attributable to other observed characteristics. There are 
seemingly modest differences between the wages of males employed in 
contracting/consulting work and those of their counterparts in regular employment. 
Finally, there is the general result that additional years of general labour market 
experience have positive implications for wages development: each year of additional 
lifetime experience increases earnings by approximately five percent. 
  The results presented in the next column of the table look beyond the latter finding 
in providing estimates of any differential effect of atypical work on experience capital. 
Given the transitory nature of temporary jobs, it might not be unexpected to see a lesser 
return vis-à-vis open-ended employment. Although the coefficient estimates for the 
interaction terms are statistically insignificant, for male workers with one year of lifetime 
experience the implied penalty to one temporary job over the first six years of the career is 
approximately 25.1% falling to 16.4% with ten years experience. For male contracting/ 
consulting workers the corresponding values are a premium of 27.5% falling to a penalty 
of 4.1%. In the case of females a premium is implied for one atypical job over the first six 
years of a career, although as can be seen from column (5) of the table this declines for 
temporary and contracting/consulting workers with ten years of experience, and is actually 
reversed (i.e. becomes a penalty) in the case of temporaries. 
  In focusing on the number of atypical jobs held by a worker to derive the above 
results, we are not accounting directly for the actual time spent in such work 
arrangements. As an extreme example, consider two workers one of whom takes a 
temporary job as a (certain) stepping stone into regular employment while the other 
spends the entire six-year period in the same temporary job. Both workers will record only 
one temporary job, but it seems unlikely that this would have the same effect on each   9
worker’s earnings. To investigate this issue, we further exploited the work diaries 
maintained by the NLSY79 respondents to derive a measure of the number of years spent 
in each type of atypical employment. We then substituted this measure for the number of 
jobs argument(s). Summary findings of our re-estimations are contained in Table 5. 
(Table 5 near here) 
As was the case in Table 4, spending time in temporary employment is more 
detrimental for males. The results obtained in the column (3) of Table 5 indicate that each 
year spent by a male in temporary work reduces his earnings by about 15%, although the 
coefficient estimate for the quadratic term again suggests that there is some mitigation of 
this wage penalty over the employment interval. For females, the results given in column 
(5) of the table indicate that temporary employment plays even less of a role than before in 
the determination of their earnings once other observed differences are taken into account. 
Focusing on the results in columns (4) and (6), however, we can see that the cost of 
working as a temporary worker for one year results in a continuing penalty for both 
genders. For males, the penalty is 23.8% after a year falling modestly to 17.1% after ten 
years. But for females the penalty is just 3.25% after one year and 0.95% after ten years. 
There is no such continuing penalty in the case of one year’s employment in 
contracting/consulting job. For males there is actually a premium (of 24.7% after one year 
falling to 4.6% after ten years). For females there is even some suggestion of a penalty 
being transformed into a modest premium (from -14.4% after one year to 3.5% after ten 
years). 
(Figures 1 and 2 near here) 
The effects of different contract types on wages can be explored diagrammatically 
by describing wage paths for a number of career choices. Again using the coefficient 
estimates in Tables 4 and 5, we construct four such synthetic profiles for males and 
females. Profile 1 describes the case where the worker is employed in a permanent job 
throughput the sample period. Profile 2 (3) depicts a situation in which the worker holds a 
temporary (contracting/consulting) job in the first period, followed by employment in a 
permanent job therereafter. Finally, profile 4 is the case where the worker holds three 
temporary jobs before transitioning into permanent employment. These wage trajectories 
are reproduced in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.   10
Beginning with the specification based on the number of atypical jobs, it is 
apparent from Figure 1 that male contracting and consulting workers are a cut above the 
rest and conversely for their fellows in temporary jobs. That is, workers who take either 
one or three temporary jobs before transitioning into regular open-ended employment earn 
less and continue to earn less than their counterparts in continuous regular employment, 
the gap between them narrowing only very slowly over time. It is as if the number of 
temporary jobs directly proxies unobserved differences in ability. As far as male 
consulting/contracting jobs are concerned, no earnings benefit accrues to switching out of 
this type of atypical work into regular employment since the earnings gap favoring former 
contracting/consulting workers narrows through time although it certainly persists over the 
time frame considered in the figure. 
The picture for women is somewhat different. Most obviously the structure is 
much less dispersed and the gaps between profiles less pronounced. Points of contact with 
the male trajectories are, first, that former contracting/consulting workers continue to earn 
the most, although the gap between them and regular workers narrows, and, second, that 
those with three temporary jobs before they transition into regular employment continue to 
earn distinctly less than regular workers and actually deteriorate relatively. The main 
difference, then, is that those with one temporary job who transition into regular 
employment seemingly earn more than ever-regular workers to begin with but are 
subsequently overtaken by them. That said, the earnings gaps in question are very modest. 
With the possible exception of profile 4 types, there is little to suggest in the female case 
that number of temporary jobs might proxy unobserved heterogeneity. 
Figure 2 replaces the number of jobs measure with time spent in atypical jobs. The 
earnings profiles shown for males fairly closely follow those reported earlier in Figure 1. 
That is to say there is no indication that switching out of temporary work into regular 
work is associated with catch up, while the earnings advantage of former 
consulting/contracting workers is now subject to less erosion. As far as females are 
concerned, however, there is much stronger evidence of catch up in the wake of transitions 
from one or three temporary jobs into regular employment. And for this specification, 
those transitioning from contracting/consulting work display the sharpest earnings 
progression of all, albeit from the lowest starting point.   11
 
IV. Conclusions 
Reflecting data considerations, there has been rather less investigation of the nature and 
consequences of atypical work in the United States than in Europe. Of late, this imbalance 
has if anything grown. Partly for this reason, the extant U.S. evidence on the implications 
of atypical work for employment continuity and wages is also more polarized, with some 
observers continuing to characterize atypical work as providing dead end jobs with poor 
wages and prospects and others seeing them more as stepping stones to permanent or at 
least regular employment. The caveat is that some atypical jobs in the United States have 
always been regarded as paying well, even offering a premium over regular, open-ended 
employment.  
In this note, we have sought to offer a fresh view of the U.S. evidence by 
examining job transitions and wage development for two atypical jobs at either end of the 
wage continuum: temporary workers, comprising agency and direct hire temps, and 
consulting/contracting workers. In this endeavour we have drawn directly on Booth, 
Francesconi, and Frank’s (2002) important study of workers on fixed-term contracts and 
those in casual and seasonal jobs, published as part of an EJ symposium on temporary 
work in Europe. Although we are unable to investigate the job satisfaction enjoyed by 
temporary workers or examine their training opportunities as do these authors, we can 
broadly replicate their treatment of the effects of temporary work on career prospects 
subject to the limitations of the U.S. data. 
  And we report a real measure of support for Booth, Francsconi, and Frank with 
respect to our (different) category of temporary workers, while at the same time 
confirming past research on the more privileged position of contracting/consulting 
workers. That is to say, on the negative side we find that male temps suffer a material cet. 
par. wage disadvantage that persists with only very slight sign of narrowing after the 
transition into regular work More positively, the situation confronting female temporary 
workers is much brighter, also in line with Booth, Francesconi, and Frank, at least for our 
preferred measure of time spent in atypical work. The difference in our case is that there is 
less evidence of a wage penalty to begin with.    12
At a descriptive level, temporary jobs are indeed stepping stones to regular 
employment. But unobserved differences in worker quality seemingly lie behind the 
finding that males who enter regular employment after one or more spells of temporary 
work close the gap at a glacial rate. For females on the other hand any earnings gap 
associated with taking temporary jobs before entering regular employment is modest to 
begin with and narrows over time. There is only the slenderest of evidence pointing to 
unobserved quality differences between females in atypical employment and their 
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Footnotes 
1. Atypical worker directives dealing with part-timers, fixed-term contract workers, and 
agency temps were first mooted in the early 1980s but draft legislation covering the first 
two groups was not enacted into law until in the late 1990s (see Official Journal, 1998, 
1999, respectively). Legislation on agency workers has proved altogether more 
controversial given the diversity of law and custom practice within the EU. Thus, for 
example, the present legislation was first proposed by the Commission in 2002.  Final 
passage of the draft legislation some six years later hinged on a mix of external and 
internal concessions. The former included British opt-outs on yet more controversial 
legislation in the form of the ultimately abortive working hours’ directive. Among the 
internal concessions, apart from the derogation noted in the text, was the exemption from 
equal treatment in respect of pay where agency temps having a permanent employment 
contract with their agency continued to be paid between assignments.   
2. By the same token, member states are to review existing restrictions or prohibitions of 
the use of temporary agency workers – presumably including limits on the sectors or 
special situations in which temporary agency workers can be used or on the maximum 
duration of assignments – in order to verify that they are justified on grounds of health and 
safety ‘or the need to ensure that the labour market functions properly and abuses are 
prevented.’ Note that these provisions, however, do not cover national requirements on the 
registration, licensing, certification, financial guarantees or monitoring of temporary work 
agencies. 
3. But for a review of the U.S. atypical worker wage literature, see Addison and Surfield 
(2007).  
4. In addition, data from the 2000 wave is used to update the durations of jobs held by 
respondents in 1998; see Table 2. 
5. For our second sample, we do not go back further than 1993 given the progressive loss 
of data on both pay and work type prior to this wave of the NLSY79. We can go a little 
further back in the case of out first sample because we are not concerned with wage data 
but only jobs. 
6. See Addison and Surfield (2009) on the efficacy of this aggregation.   14
7.  A number of regressors in our wage equation are likely to be correlated with 
unobserved individual and job-specific characteristics. Unfortunately, given insufficient 
variation in the number of jobs held by respondents, we were unable to fully instrument 
for potentially endogenous variables in the manner of Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (see 
their IV/GLS estimates in Table 6).  We understand that this is a limitation of this part of 
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Table 1 
Distribution of Temporary and Contracting/Consulting Work and Mean Hourly Wages by 
Type of Contract and Gender (wages in constant 1982-84 dollars) 
 
 
 Whole  Sample  Males  Females 
 
(a) Atypical Work [%] 
 
Temporary  Workers  6.17% 5.69% 6.68% 
Contractors/Consultants  1.79% 2.17% 1.39% 
N 13,420  6,851  6,569 
 
(b) Hourly Wages [$] 
 
Regular Workers (RW)  10.79  12.82  8.59 
Temporary Workers (TW)  5.96  6.38  5.61 
Contractors/Consultants (C/C)13.36  13.77  12.54 
 
(c) Wage Differences 
 
RW – TW  4.82***  6.44**  2.98*** 
  (2.78) (1.98) (3.18) 
 
RW – C/C  -2.57  -0.95  03.95** 
  (1.36) (0.29) (2.32) 
 
TW – C/C  -7.40***  -7.40***  -6.93*** 
  (7.58) (5.16) (4.74) 
 
 
Source: NLSY79, 1993-98. 
Notes: Wages are expressed in constant 1982-84 dollars. Absolute values of the t-test of 
the wage differences are in parentheses; ***, ** indicating that the difference is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Labor Market States, Employment Duration and Transition Rates 
 
 
(a) Employment Duration, by Work Arrangement 
 
 
  Regular Workers  Temporary Workers Contractors/Consultants 
 
Average,  in  years  5.04 1.18 2.60 
(standard deviation)  (5.43) (1.68) (2.51) 
 




(b) Transition Rates, by Work Arrangement 
 
   Next or Ending Work Arrangement 
 
Initial Arrangement    Regular Work    Temporary Work     Contracting/Consulting 
 
Regular Work  11,918 (96.49%)  340 (2.75%)  94 (0.76%) 
 
Temporary Work  399 (48.19%)  421 (50.85%)  8 (0.87%) 
 
Contracting/Consulting  108 (45.00%)  8 (3.33%)  124 (51.67%) 
 
N     12,425 (92.59%)        769 (5.73%)        226 (1.68%) 
 
 
Source: NLSY79, 1992-98. 
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Table 3 
Exit from Temporary Agency Work to Regular Work 
(Estimates from a proportional hazard model, non-parametric baseline hazard specification) 
  
Transition from Temporary to Regular Employment  
 Men  Women 
Variables (1)  (3) 
    
Individual Characteristics   
Age   -0.328***  -0.279*** 
 (0.0512)  (0.0390) 
Education 0.105*  0.0188 
 (0.0582)  (0.0622) 
Black 0.700**  0.228 
 (0.310)  (0.266) 
Hispanic -0.428  -0.589* 
 (0.360)  (0.349) 
Married 0.336  -0.129 
 (0.228)  (0.230) 
AFQT Scores:     
Verbal ability  -0.148  0.584*** 
 (0.224)  (0.215) 
Math ability  -0.0839  0.0145 
 (0.195)  (0.211) 
Practical ability  0.305  -0.558* 
 (0.219)  (0.291) 
Coding ability  0.137  -0.0910 
 (0.156)  (0.131) 
    
Job Characteristics   
Part-time -0.0597  0.00766 
 (0.265)  (0.225) 
Employer Size  8.03e-06  -9.81e-07 
 (6.85e-06)  (6.22e-06) 
Regional location   
North East  -0.748**  -0.497 
 (0.374)  (0.396) 
South -0.344  -0.0549 
 (0.290)  (0.249) 
West 0.122  0.145 
 (0.336)  (0.336) 
North Central 
a a 
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Industrial Sector    
Agriculture -1.090 0.185 
 (1.444)  (0.691) 
Mining -1.069  0.587 
 (1.345)  (0.961) 
Manufacturing -1.237  -0.189 
 (1.341)  (0.619) 
Transport./ -1.170 0.634 
Comm. (1.454)  (0.656) 
Trade -1.298  0.267 
 (1.391)  (0.556) 
Business Service  -0.898  0.407 
 (1.309)  (0.594) 
Professional   -1.140  0.0981 
Service (1.372)  (0.573) 
Personal Service  -2.602*  -0.766 
 (1.494)  (0.641) 
Public   -1.327  0.0964 
Administration (1.372)  (0.633) 
FIRE 
a a 
    
Employment Capacity   
Managerial -0.0147 -0.477 
 (0.680)  (0.537) 
Clerical 0.580  -0.00606 
 (0.911)  (0.432) 
Service 0.480  0.626 
 (0.709)  (0.459) 
Operator/ 0.341  0.0212 
Laborer (0.701)  (0.464) 
Skilled laborer  0.0526  0.176 
 (0.746)  (0.564) 
Technical/Sales 
a a 
    
Log-likelihood -415.4  -485.8 
χ
2 120.74  92.38 
 [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
N 192  236 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Standard errors have been clustered by the 
individual. The model χ
2 statistic has 28 degrees of freedom and its p-value is shown in brackets. Ability 
scores were obtained by taking the scores reported by the respondents in the 1981 AFQT and regressed on a 
vector of age and education dummies. The residuals are represented in these variables. The test scores were 
combined into one of four types of ability: verbal, mathematical, practical, and coding ability. 
a indicates 
excluded group. Estimation was also performed with gamma-distributed latent random effects in order to 
capture unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. Since the gamma variance parameter converged to 
zero, results of this procedure are not reported here, but are available upon request.  ***,**,* denote 




Impact of Temporary and Contract Work Spells on Log Wages, Summary Results 
 Whole  Sample  Men  Women 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            
No. Temporary Jobs  (NTJ)  -0.139***  -0.0878 -0.230***  -0.313*  -0.0654*  0.0432 
 (0.0318)  (0.0788)  (0.0485) (0.183) (0.0372)  (0.0623) 
No. Temporary Jobs
2 0.0198  0.0169  0.0486**  0.0438**  -0.00258  -0.00522 
 (0.0145)  (0.0150)  (0.0220)  (0.0221) (0.0140)  (0.0139) 
NTJ*lifetime experience    -0.00494    0.0193    -0.0191* 
   (0.0118)    (0.0280)    (0.0105) 
NTJ*lifetime experience
2   8.00e-05    -0.000884    0.000747 
   (0.000454)    (0.000989)    (0.000461) 
No. Contract/Consult. Jobs (NCJ)  -0.0747  0.125  -0.139  0.223  0.134  0.134 
 (0.0893)  (0.181)  (0.109)  (0.280)  (0.164)  (0.234) 
No. Contract/ Consult. Jobs
2 0.0837  0.0904*  0.102* 0.108* -0.0351  -0.00712 
 (0.0528)  (0.0527)  (0.0579) (0.0590)  (0.109)  (0.114) 
NCJ*lifetime experience    -0.0412    -0.0585    -0.0262 
   (0.0370)    (0.0542)    (0.0358) 
NCJ*lifetime experience
2   0.00173    0.00213    0.00161 
   (0.00155)    (0.00224)    (0.00130) 
Current lifetime experience  0.0526***  0.0545***  0.0526***  0.0533***  0.0465***  0.0489*** 
 (0.00412)  (0.00442)  (0.00665)  (0.00720) (0.00514)  (0.00550) 
Current lifetime experience
2 -0.00055***  -0.00062***  -0.00072*** -0.00073***  -0.00037*  -0.00047** 
 (0.00015)  (0.00016)  (0.00023)  (0.00024) (0.00019)  (0.00020) 
Constant 0.865***  0.856***  0.806***  0.805***  0.792***  0.776*** 
 (0.0862)  (0.0864)  (0.126) (0.126) (0.116)  (0.116) 
            
R
2 0.378  0.378  0.344  0.344  0.417  0.417 
Observations 14138  7826 6312 
Individuals 4731  2516  2215 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Each specification also includes dummy variables for region, race, ethnicity, marital status, part-time 
status, occupation, industry, firm size, and proxies for ability/aptitude derived from AFQT scores, as well as a measure of worker age. All robust standard errors 
are listed in parentheses.  ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.    22
 
Table 5 
Impact of Time in Temporary and Contract Work on Log Wages, Summary Results 
 Whole  Sample  Men  Women 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            
No. Years in Temporary Jobs (YTJ)  -0.0968***  -0.0805 -0.167***  -0.262** -0.0111 -0.0329 
 (0.0218)  (0.0737)  (0.0320) (0.122) (0.0516)  (0.109) 
No. Years in Temporary Jobs
 2  0.00826*** 0.00839*** 0.0150*** 0.0144***  -0.00575  -0.00495 
 (0.00249)  (0.00269)  (0.00324)  (0.00362) (0.0191) (0.0187) 
YTJ *lifetime experience    -0.00247    0.00949    0.00560 
   (0.0108)    (0.0176)    (0.0132) 
YTJ *lifetime experience
2   8.42e-05    -0.000179    -0.000276 
   (0.000363)    (0.000595)    (0.000417) 
No. Years in Contract Jobs (YCJ)  0.0551  -0.00233  0.0279  0.288*  0.0526  -0.179 
 (0.0339)  (0.0961)  (0.0363) (0.156) (0.0714)  (0.144) 
No. Years in Contract Jobs
 2 -0.0111  -0.0114  -0.0115*  -0.00963  0.00445  0.00696 
 (0.00893)  (0.00903)  (0.00664)  (0.00695) (0.0220) (0.0185) 
YCJ *lifetime experience    0.00739    -0.0333*    0.0285 
   (0.0126)    (0.0196)    (0.0200) 
YCJ *lifetime experience
2   -0.000214    0.000998*    -0.000775 
   (0.000421)    (0.000604)    (0.000753) 
Current lifetime experience  0.0529***  0.0526***  0.0541***  0.0550***  0.0482***  0.0458*** 
 (0.00401)  (0.00408)  (0.00652)  (0.00663) (0.00508)  (0.00516) 
Current lifetime experience
2 -0.00056***  -0.00055***  -0.00072*** -0.00076***  -0.00043**  -0.00035* 
 (0.00014)  (0.00014)  (0.00022)  (0.00022) (0.00019)  (0.00019) 
Constant 0.817***  0.819***  0.685***  0.678***  0.834***  0.849*** 
 (0.0765)  (0.0766)  -0.167*** (0.113)  (0.104)  (0.104) 
            
R
2 0.383  0.383  0.351  0.351  0.416  0.416 
Observations 15949  8688  7258 
Individuals 4811  2553  2258 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Each specification also includes dummy variables for region, race, marital status, part-time 
status, occupation, industry, firm size, and proxies for ability/aptitude derived from AFQT scores, as well as a measure of worker age. All robust 
standard errors are listed in parentheses. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.   23
 
Notes: Predictions based on the estimates provided in Table 4. Pattern 1: Worker is always employed in a 
permanent job. Pattern 2: Worker holds one temporary job in first period and is employed in permanent 
employment thereafter. Pattern 3: Worker holds one contracting/consulting job and is employed in 
permanent employment thereafter. Pattern 4: Worker holds three temporary jobs and then is employed in 
permanent employment.   24
Notes: Predictions based on the estimates provided in Table 5. Pattern 1: Worker is always employed in a 
permanent job. Pattern 2: Worker employed as a temporary worker in first year and is employed in 
permanent employment thereafter. Pattern 3: Worker employed in contracting/consulting job in first year 
and is employed in permanent employment thereafter. Pattern 4: Worker holds three years of temporary 
employment and then is employed in permanent employment. 